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0. Abstract 
Through a discourse analysis of American foreign policy, this rapport examines the 
development in American identity reproduction from George W. Bush to Barack Obama.  
 Historically, American self-narrative, influenced by Wilsonianism, has 
reproduced America as a ‘crusader nation’. Along with a poststructuralist perspective, 
adopted from David Campbell, and employing the case of the war on terror to exemplify 
the construction of ‘danger’, this rapport seeks to support the thesis that American identity 
reproduction has changed into a self-narrative of a less crusading nation.  
 In methodological terms, as suggested by Lene Hansen, this rapport entails a 
comparative discourse analysis of the State of the Union speeches made by the two 
presidents, where the construction of the Self and the Others and the relation between 
them, which constitutes the reproduction of identity, are considered along with the 
securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. Upon this analytical base the different 
aspects of Wilsonianism, adopted by the respective presidents, are sought pointed out, and 
the analysis concludes upon American identity reproduction in support to the thesis; The 
presidents differ in several aspects; Their constructions of Self and Others and the relation 
between them; On the question of securitization against the articulated radical ‘danger’; 
And in their adoption of Wilsonian aspects; All of which shows a discursive development 
towards reproducing, to a lesser degree, American identity as a ‘crusader nation’.  
   
 
1. Introduction: The Field of Interest  
Ever since the late 19th century, America has played a decisive role as a global hegemon, 
crusading within foreign affairs, promoting it’s own principles, and has thus been a 
dominant contributor, shaping and reforming the international system of states and 
nations (Dunne, Kurki, Smith; 2010; 87).  
 America seems to have been on a self-proclaimed mission, which according to the 
historian, Tony Smith, is a mission, in the words of Woodrow Wilson, ’to make the world 
safe for democracy’ (Smith; 2012; 3). Throughout the 20th century, this American identity, 
as a ‘crusader nation’, has had real consequences, being a pre-conditional factor of 
American foreign policy activity and decision-making. 
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In international relations theory there have long been a debate between traditional realists 
and poststructuralists, whether America, and states in general, can employ other identities. 
Thus, the question is, if state identity is fixed and determined by a power-driven nature of 
states and anarchic structure of the international system, or whether state identity is a 
discursive performance, a social construction (Dunne, Kurki, Smith; 2010; 63, 226). The 
present rapport will look into this particular debate about the nature of state identity.  
 The initial question of interest has been whether American identity can be other 
than a crusading global hegemon. David Campbell contributes to this debate with his 
poststructuralist theory of identity reproduction, understanding foreign policy discourse, 
in particular, to be reproducing state identity, by discursively constructing the Other as 
‘danger’ (Campbell; 1998; 8). Thus, to further examine the question suggested above, I have 
narrowed my field of interest to American foreign policy discourse, employing the case of 
the discursive development from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, in relation to the war 
on terror.  
 The particular historical span for this case is chosen due to its relevancy, as it is 
the most recent historical development for analytical examination. More importantly, when 
Obama went into office in 2008, an election which resulted in an administrational shift 
from a republican government to a democratic government, expectations of change, 
regarding America’s role in the international system, were high. As an article from CNN, in 
2008, points out, what was internationally and publicly anticipated, was that‘Obama's 
election offers a monumental transformation of America's face to the world’
1
. Thus, 
expectations were placed on a more diplomatic, conciliatory administration than that of the 
former.  
 Regarding the choice of issue, the war on terror, this has had emphatic presence 
in American foreign policy ever since the terrorist attack in 2001. The choice of 
exemplifying the thesis with this particular case is also due to the nature of the war on 
terror; It is especially interesting from a poststructuralist perspective, since it lacks a 
defined spatiality with no giving enemy or war-frontiers (Dunne, Kurki, Smith; 2012; 191). 
                                                        
1 http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-05/politics/labott.foreign.policy_1_barack-obama-
obamamania-obama-administration?_s=PM:POLITICS  
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In the present rapport, the question of interest is how this ‘danger’ of terrorism is 
constructed and whether it is ‘securitized’ by claiming it an existential threat, thus 
legitimizing a taking of action. 
 
The main problem of the present rapport, that I seek to answer, is as follows: 
Main problem: The development from Bush to Obama; Has American identity changed into 
being that of a less crusading nation? 
 Considering the main problem, my thesis, and what I would like to demonstrate 
in this rapport, is that American identity has changed during the historical time span from 
Bush to Obama, exemplified with the case of the war on terror. More importantly, this 
change has been coherent to the international and public anticipations, that the Obama 
Administration would reproduce an American identity more diplomatic and conciliatory, 
thus less ‘crusading’, than the Bush Administration.  
 
As already suggested, America has, for more than a century, seemingly been on a mission of 
‘crusade’ and proclaiming its principles worldwide. According to Smith, this phenomenon 
is highly due to the strong influence of Wilsonianism in American politics of the 20th 
century (Smith; 2012; 39).  Thus, to answer the question above, and to best argue for my 
thesis, I have further directed my analysis in order to provide it with a more specific 
substance and to understand the constructed causes of this discursive change. The analysis 
will therefore concern the traces of Wilsonianism in the foreign policy discourses of Bush 
and Obama, respectively. The following question should thus be understood as a sub-
problem to the main problem, providing the latter with a more specific analytical aim and 
constructively causal understanding: 
 Sub-problem: Having been the determining element of the reproduction of American 
identity, what aspects of Wilsonianism, thus reproducing American identity, are adopted in 
the foreign policy discourses of the republican Bush Administration and of the democratic 
Obama Administration.  
 
1.1. The Rapport in Structural Terms 
The contribution of the present rapport thus lies within poststructuralism and the debate 
involving reproduction of identity through security- and foreign policy discourse. 
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Furthermore, in providing an example of the war on terror, this rapport will make a 
contribution to the debate about whether or not President Obama has managed to meet the 
public expectations of a change in America’s ‘face to the world’, as termed in the CNN 
article.  
 To begin with, I outline the theory behind the poststructuralist assumptions of 
state identity, in relation to foreign policy discourse and securitization, when examining 
the theory of Campbell and the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, explaining 
the relation between them and the function of this theoretical marriage regarding the 
analysis.  
 This section is followed by a review of method, adopted from Lene Hansen. In 
this section, I will explicate the scientific theoretical viewpoint of poststructuralism, outline 
the research questions, guiding the analysis, and argue the particular analytical choices 
made.  
 Following, I have included an overview of the basic discourse and its geneology, 
Wilsonianism and exceptionalism, in respective order. The consideration of basic 
discourses and geneology, as recommended by Hansen, is providing the analyst with 
discursive clues when examining the texts in question. 
 With the theoretical and methodological perspectives defined, the comparative 
analysis is introduced. I will begin with explaining the structural choices of the analysis and 
the choice of textual outset. The very analysis is composed of two separate analytical 
sections, starting with Bush, followed by Obama, providing a foundation for comparing the 
two in a concluding section.      
 Last, as part of the conclusion, I have added a critical perspective on my research-
findings, followed by a suggestion of a possible further examination.  
 
In general, I have aimed to explain the choices and the exclusions, where they are relevant. 
Objective criticism of my own findings, choices and exclusions will thus be integrated 
throughout the entirety of the rapport to uphold a natural flow of information and 
consideration.  
  
 
 6 
2. Theory  
As indicated, the theoretical outset of this project is based on David Campbell’s 
poststructuralist theory of identity reproduction. Furthermore, I have chosen to link 
Campbell’s theory, the articulation of the Other as ‘danger’, with the Copenhagen School 
concept of securitization. The choice is based on my aim to emphasize this particular 
theoretical point of Campbell’s and to put analytical perspective to the discursive 
differences, specific to this point.   
 The two theories build on the same ontology, which we shall see, and as such 
they are compatible.  However, they are essentially different takes of perspective on the 
construction of the Other as ‘danger’; Campbell suggests that the construction of ‘danger’ is 
essential to identity reproduction, whereas the Copenhagen School understands the 
construction of an existential threat as a discursive act to legitimize the use of 
extraordinary measures. 
 The inclusion of securitization theory is to give strength to my an account on how 
the construction of the Other as ‘danger’ is utilized in the discourses of Bush and Obama; 
Whether or not they securitize; Thus whether or not the Other is constructed as a ‘danger’, 
that equals an existential threat. The discursive conduction will interplay with certain 
aspects of Wilsonianism and will thus be contributing to the reproduced identity, as I will 
explain further on. 
 
2.1. Poststructuralist Theory of David Campbell: Reproduction of State Identity  
Concerning the nature of state identity, Campbell builds his theory of reproduction on his 
concept of the state.  
 To Campbell, states have no ontological status other than its actions, and these 
actions are what constitute its reality and identity. There is no stable state identity, in 
ontological terms, but rather, the identity of the state is produced through a ‘discourse of 
primary and stable identity’. Thus, state identity is ‘(…) constituted in time (…) through a 
stylized repetition of acts (…)’ (Campbell; 1998; 10).  As such, stable state identity is 
produced in a regulated process of discursive repetitions.  In other words, regarding stable 
state identities, what is stable is not the nature of the state in ontological terms, but the 
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discourse that reproduces its identity. Due to this concept of state identity, Campbell 
stresses that identity needs constant reproduction.  
 As such, Campbell rejects the understanding implied in epistemic realism, of 
which ‘(…) the world comprises objects whose existence is independent of ideas and beliefs 
about them (…) that there are material causes to which events and actions can be reduced.’ 
(Campbell; 1998; 4).  Instead, Campbell builds upon the tradition of constructivist 
epistemology that, true to poststructuralism, embraces the existence of the empirical, but 
with the conception that the empirical exists independently from the language which seeks 
to describe it (Dunne, Kurki, Smith; 2010; 185).  
 
Identity is always dependent on what it is not, the Other, which according to Campbell, 
regarding foreign policy discourse, is equal to a radical ‘danger’, ‘enemy’ or ‘threat’. A 
constituency of the Other, is always a necessity for a state to reproduce its identity; ‘The 
constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity 
or existence: it is its condition of possibility.’ (Campbell; 1998; 13).  As suggested here, the 
discursive construction of the Other, serving as self-reproducing tool, a ‘possibility’, is what 
is inherent of foreign policy from a poststructuralist view, as that of Campbell’s. Therefore, 
in his work, Campbell examines the process of identity-reproduction through foreign policy 
discourse, as will also be employed in the present rapport.  
 Campbell’s conception of the Other is equal to his concept of the state. As 
indicated above, he rejects the realist assumption that threats and dangers are self-
constituent objects in the world. Rather, nothing is a threat in itself. As such, a threat is 
always connected to the agent that perceives it as ‘danger’ (Campbell; 1998; 2). 
 
The poststructuralist point, that Campbell suggests, is that state identity and threats are 
constructed through the social act of discourse. Contrary to realism, Campbell suggests that 
the study of foreign policy should lie on the articulation of threats, the security discourses. 
The analyst should employ a ‘mode of historical representation’, thus, look into the history 
of security discourse and make use of ‘the logic of interpretation’, aiming to avoid merely 
specifying the ‘real’ causes of threats, but rather, seek to understand the various 
consequences of the possible self-representations in state security discourse (Campbell; 
1998; 4). A historical perspective is thus decisive when understanding state identity. The 
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discontinuing nature of action can only be perceived when looking at it historically, i.e. 
over time. A fixed image could never support a poststructuralist thesis, like that of 
Campbell’s, that state identity existence is dependent on constant reproduction through 
discourses.  According to Campbell, this is why states construct the Other. They will wither 
away if they cannot position themselves as opposed to what they are not. Therefore, it is 
the discursive construction of the Other that helps define states and settles their borders 
both in spatial, temporal and ethical terms (Campbell; 1998; 12).    
 
Campbell argues that America is a particular case in point, due to its nature as an ‘imagined 
community’; The roots of Americans are situated in places other than America, giving its 
history of the settlers. In Campbell’s words, America is ‘defined (…) more by absence than 
presence (…) America is peculiarly dependent on representational practices for its being.’ 
(Campbell; 1998; 91).  
  
In consistency to the concept of securitization, this Other, as ‘danger’, can also be 
understood as the articulation of an existential threat to something that can claim 
existential necessity, whether it is national identity or state sovereignty (Byzan, Wæver, de 
Wilde; 1998; 21-22). Hence this theoretical union, securitization can, in Campbell’s 
terminology, be interpreted as a discursive act to maintain an identity. In other words, to 
define oneself implies the construction of the Other as ‘danger’, which can be articulated as 
equal to an existential threat, legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures.  
 
2.2. The Copenhagen School: Securitization 
As already suggested, Campbell’s identity theory, outlined above is sharing basic 
ontological assumptions with the theory of securitization. In the following, I will explain 
the selected points of the latter theory, which are both compatible with Campbell and 
relevant to the present rapport, thus further enabling an analysis on the question of 
whether or not, the respective presidents securitize in relation to the war on terror. Should 
legitimization of extraordinary measures appear, indicating the construction of the Other 
as an existential threat, this will interplay with certain aspects of Wilsonianism and will 
thus influence the reproduction of American identity.   
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In essence, a securitizing move is a speech act, and as such, a construction of an existential 
threat that, by the perceived fatal nature of the threat, legitimizes the use of extraordinary 
measures. More specifically, it can be understood as a political issue turned into a security 
problem. ‘“Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the 
issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but 
because the issue is presented as such a threat.’  (Byzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 24).  
 Furthermore, a securitization is the securitizing move being accepted by the 
audience (Byzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 25). As such, it is a social act of discourse, also 
suggested by Campbell in relation to the construction of the Other.   
 In their joint work, Byzan, Wæver and de Wilde are further arguing that an 
‘Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the 
referent object in question.’ (Byzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 21). Thus, reminiscent of the 
basic ontological assumption of Campbell, an existential threat is not a universal existential 
threat, but has this quality only in relation to the referent object, such as a given state 
identity, the traditional referent object in the military-political sector. This is the rational 
behind the choice of only considering the military-political sector and thus disregard the 
several other sectors in which securitization can be constructed, as the Copenhagen School 
argues (Byzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 7); States, claiming existential necessity, securitize 
within the military sector to secure its identity, on which it is dependent (Byzan, Wæver, de 
Wilde; 1998; 36). When considering Campbell, who suggests that states are existentially 
relying on an unending reproduction of their identities, states can be understood to 
construct existential threats to obtain this reproduction of identity.   
 
Securitization is an intersubjective process of constructing an existential threat, which has 
‘real’ effects and consequences in the world. As such, it causes actors to operate in certain 
manners towards the securitized issue, legitimizing extraordinary measures (Byzan, 
Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 30).  This might be seen as a fundamental difference between 
Campbell and the Copenhagen School; The mere construction of the Other transcends its 
discursive nature into a manifestation in ‘reality’, by way of securitization, causing 
intervention or, in this case actualizing the American ‘crusade’.   
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In discourse analysis, what is indicative of securitization is a security argument. This type 
of argument is typically about the future, and thus, involves two scenarios: What will 
happen if we don’t securitize? And what will happen if we do?  
 Of present interest are the deviances in the construction of the Other as ‘danger’, 
in Campbell’s terms, and the application, upon this, of a security argument. As I will show in 
the analysis, ‘danger’ is not consistently applied a securitization since, discursively, ‘danger’ 
is not always interpreted as equal to an existential threat.   
 
Campbell’s theory of identity reproduction, married to the concept of securitization, will be 
the underlying ontological principles in the actual analysis. The methodological outset is 
thus determined by the very same poststructuralist conceptions.  
 In the following section, I will outline the method of discourse analysis, adopted 
from Lene Hansen, who further suggests that the Other, constructed as a radical ‘danger’, is 
merely one character of what may discursively constitute the Other; The non-Other is an 
equal contributor in reproducing self-identity.  
 
 
3. Method 
I have employed the methodology of Lene Hansen who, in consistency with Campbell, takes 
upon a poststructuralist perspective when suggesting the methodological approach of 
discourse analysis. This section will explain the poststructuralist mode of method behind 
discourse analysis, consider the construction of Self and Others, and provide a 
conceptualization of indicators, to use in the analysis, before outlining the analytical 
framework.   
 
3.1 Discourse Analysis 
The poststructuralist understanding of foreign policy discourse and identity enables an 
alternate research in the field of international relations, traditionally based upon the 
ontology of realism and rationalism (Hansen; 2006; 5). As such, rather than specifying ‘real’ 
causes of certain policies and political action, poststructuralism provides answers about 
the possible consequences of the employed discourses (Campbell; 1998; 2).  
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 The poststructuralist ontology, which is followed throughout this rapport, entails 
‘(…) language as constitutive for what is brought into being’ (Hansen; 2006; 17), thereby 
suggesting that material objects obtain meaning through language. However, materials 
matter, but it is only through language that the material is giving its social meaning.  
 Language, being social as a communicative tool, can be understood as the field of 
inclusions and exclusions. It is where subjects, i.e. Selves and Others, are produced and 
reproduced. Implicit in the poststructuralist understanding, these Selves and Others are 
not objective truths, since ‘(…) There is no ‘extra-discursive’ materiality that sets itself 
forward independently of its discursive representation (…) the material (…) is always 
discursively mediated.’ (Hansen; 2006; 25). The Selves and Others are constructed 
discursively, hence, the methodological choice of discourse analysis, in relation to the 
present examination on American identity reproduction.  
 Poststructuralism wants to answer the question of how material factors are 
produced and valued into a social meaning; How the material facts come to be interpreted 
as threats, since nothing is a threat in itself (Hansen; 2006; 22).  
 
3.1.1.The Methodological Starting Point: Webs of Signs 
Hansen argues that identity is always articulated in a web of signs. Constructing identity, 
the Self and the Other are linked to descriptive terms. In foreign policy discourse the Self 
can likely be linked to adjectives like ‘good’ and ‘civilized’, while the Other is linked to 
terms like ‘evil’ and ‘barbaric’. However, the articulation of the Self and the Other can be 
less-than-radical, termed by Hansen, meaning that the differentiated terms of the Self and 
the Other can be situated within a web of signs that are oppositions to a lesser degree.  
 To exemplify, the people of Afghanistan, while being an Other in American 
terminology, is positioned towards the American Self in a less radical position compared to 
the Taliban Other. Also, America as the ‘civilized’, can position itself against the ‘less 
civilized’, which are found in different stages of development. This means that the 
discursive construction of identity is not ontologically fixed, but is rather flexible (Hansen; 
2006; 41-42). In the analysis, I will thus differentiate between the radical Other and the 
non-Other, the latter which is not constructed as a radical ‘danger’.  
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 Hansen differs from Campbell in this view, as Campbell suggests that the Other 
equals the dichotomous opposite. The radical Other, instead of being the only articulation 
of the other, as Campbell claims, is merely one type of Other.    
 Thus, identity is to be understood through investigating the web of signs; The 
definition of the Self is never performed without relating it to the Other, and both of these 
subjects are rarely linked to only one sign, but rather, a web of juxtaposed signs. The first 
step of the analysis is to look for these webs of signs, or indications as they are, linked to 
the Self and the Other, since ‘(…) meaning and identity are constructed through a series of 
signs that are linked to each other to constitute the relations of sameness as well through a 
differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs.’ (Hansen; 2006; 42). In the actual 
analysis, these webs of signs, linked to specific identities, are defining the relation between 
the Self and the Others. It is this relation that is pre-conditioning the reproduction of 
identity. Hansen stresses three dimensions in which the relational distances between the 
Self and the Others can be constituted. Thus, the analyst should consider in which 
dimensions the relational differentiations are constituted.  
 
3.2. Dimensional Outlook: Conceptualization and Operationalization  
When analyzing foreign policy discourse, Hansen operates with three analytical lenses: the 
spatial, the temporal and the ethical. In other words, in foreign policy discourse, identity 
can be constructed by defining its boundaries in spatial, temporal and ethical terms.  
 
3.2.1. The Spatial, the Temporal and the Ethical 
As already described, the articulation of Self and Others are not merely of antagonistic 
nature. Rather, the articulation of identity can position the Self towards several Others in 
various relations and distances, which are determined by the signs linked to each of them. 
The analysis, therefore, is to be of a consideration of the Self and its relational distance to 
the respective Others that are being articulated. The relational distance can take form in 
the three distinct dimensions suggested above. It is thus understood, that the reproduction 
of identity is constituted upon the dimensional relational distance between the Self and the 
Other. 
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3.2.2. Operationalization 
To operationalize the three dimensional concepts, I will introduce some indicators for each 
dimension. These indicators serve as analytical tools to identify the dimensional nature and 
the distance of the articulated differences between the Self and the particular Other.  
 
Indicators of the spatial dimension are terms that describe physical borders, identifying an 
Other with a state or nation. Also, one should look for articulations of abstract barriers that 
inscribe a certain identity in relation to another, such as explications of certain political 
subjects like minorities, religious groups, subjects sharing a certain ideological views etc. 
Thus of interest, in relation to the present case, indicators of the spatial will be terms like 
‘Al Qaida’, ‘the Afghan people’, ‘the Afghan government’, ‘Taliban’, but also terms like 
‘Radical Islam’.   
 As with the temporal dimension, indicators are signs of time relations. A Self 
could be identified with a particular level of progress, being perhaps civilized in contrast to 
an Other, which is constructed as being uncivilized. The Self could also be articulated as 
more civilized than a particular Other. Equally important is to look for terms indicating 
non-progress, stasis and repetitious natures that are identified with Self and Others. In this 
particular case, temporal indicators are phrases concerned the spatial Others in relation to 
the Self, involving ‘development’ and phrases that suggests possibility of change or the 
contrary.       
 Signs that indicate the differentiation of the Self and Others, in the ethical 
dimension, are concerns of responsibility and how this is placed between the Self and 
Other. The analyst should look for indicators suggestive of what is the responsibility of the 
Self, and what a particular Other is held responsible for. In this case, who is responsible for 
the sufferings caused by terror? And who is innocent? 
 
3.3. The Analytical Framework 
The process of reproducing identity is essentially to construct the relational distance 
between the Self and the Other. In other words, to define a Self, you also define what it is 
not. Therefore, the relation between the Self and the Other, constructed within the three 
dimensions, the spatial, the temporal and the ethical, is what reproduces identity. Thus, for 
this examination, aiming to understand the reproduction of American identity, Hansen 
 14
provides three useful research questions, that will be employed in the discourse analysis 
(Hansen; 2006; 51):  
• Which Self and Other, and the webs of signs respectively linked thereto? 
• How radical is the difference between the Self and Other? 
• How is difference constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical 
identity? 
 As such, these questions examine the reproduced identity.  
  
Naturally, different texts deviate from one another in the articulation of the Self and the 
Other, giving the flexible nature of discourse. It is the poststructuralist analyst objective to 
identify the basic discourses within a debate. To Hansen, the analytical value of basic 
discourses is that ‘(…) they provide a lens through which a multitude of different 
representations and policies can be seen as systemically connected.’ (Hansen; 2006; 52).  
  Texts always draw upon previous texts, referring to these explicitly or implicitly. 
In other words, texts are always situated within a certain discourse, which they reflect 
(Hansen; 2006; 55). The basic discourse that will be employed in the present examination 
is the Wilsonian discourse, which is implicit of the discourse of exceptionalism.  
 The discourse of Wilsonianism is chosen because of its profound impact on 
American foreign policy throughout the 20th century (Smith; 2012; 3). Thus, many texts, 
governmental, popular etc, builds upon this discourse. The Wilsonian discourse is 
therefore widely read and publicly accepted, nationally and internationally. In order to 
further understand the Wilsonian discourse, I have chosen to look into the discourse of 
exceptionalism. As Vibeke Schou Pedersen points out in her article on the matter, 
Wilsonianism employs important aspects of exceptionalism, the latter which have thus 
been a decisive element in the American self-narrative (Pedersen; 2003; 219). 
Exceptionalism provides the analyst of the present rapport with a genealogy of conceptual 
historical representations, in other words, a further examination of the historical concepts 
inherent to Wilsonianism (Hansen; 2006; 52-54).   
 The findings of the relations between the Self and the Others will be interpreted 
in the light of this basic discourse and its genealogy. Thus, section 4 will provide specific 
discursive clues of Wilsonianism and exceptionalism, that will be sought pointed out in the 
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actual analysis, in order to emphasize what aspects of Wilsonianism is adopted by each 
president.  
 
 
4. Basic Discourse: Wilsonianism 
As Tony Smith suggests, Wilsonianism has been the ‘(…) central ambition of American 
foreign policy during the twentieth century.’ (Smith; 2012; 3). 
 Wilson’s vision was “to make the world safe for democracy”, a programme which 
founded what was later to be known as American liberal democratic internationalism or 
Wilsonianism (Smith; 2012; 84). Thus, the essential ambition of Wilsonianism was that ‘(…) 
governments should recognize each others’ legitimacy when they were constitutional 
democracies, and that they should maintain the peace through a system of collective military 
security and liberal economic exchange.’ (Smith; 2012; 84).  
 On international relations, Wilson called for an international order of economic, 
military and moral interdependence, founded upon the principles of democracy and 
liberalism. In particular, Wilson advocated for ‘respect for nationalism’ through democratic 
constitution on an international scale. Democracy was furthermore understood as the 
underlying principle of world peace and prosperity.  Thus, Wilson envisioned an 
international law and international institutions founded thereupon (Smith; 2012; 87). 
However, Wilson did not intend a world government, but rather a ‘League of Nations’, 
which should ‘(…) be the vehicle to bind (America) permanently to a management role in 
world affairs.’ (Smith; 2012;105). 
 Liberal values was essential to Wilsonianism. The defence of individual liberties 
and property rights, advocacy for reason, and government limited by law of consent, was 
seen to be universal principles (Smith; 2012; 14). Along with the conviction, that ‘(…) 
democracy was the most peace-loving and only legitimate form of government’ (Smith; 2012; 
85), Wilsonianism assigned to America the moral responsibility to propagate democracy 
and liberalism worldwide. Thus, concerning the analysis, the expressions, suggestive of 
Wilsonianism are inherent of: 
• A universal comprehension of democratic and liberal values, thus legitimizing 
worldwide spread. 
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• An advocacy of universal principles rather than self-interest. 
• A respect for nationalism. 
• A worldwide mutual understanding, unfolding in a vision of international collaboration 
and partnership. 
• American leadership in managing world affairs. 
 These are the aspects of Wilsonianism that I will use to determine the discursive 
differences and thus, the change of identity, in the comparative analysis, and shall thus 
answer the sub-problem of this rapport. 
 All aspects are linked to identity reproduction in that they can be interpreted 
into the American Self, being reflected in the web of signs, as outlined in section 3.   
 In relation to securitization, this concept, as we will see in the analysis, is 
incompatible with the Wilsonian notions of partnership and mutual understanding. If the 
Other is securitized against, partnership and understanding is not possible. Securitization 
is however compatible with a Wilsonian arrogance; That American principles are universal, 
thus claimed existential necessities, and are as such instigating the American ‘crusade’. The 
‘danger’ of Wilsonianism lies in this arrogance, thus assigning the ‘crusade’ upon America. 
As suggested by Pedersen, this Wilsonian arrogance is inherited from exceptionalism. 
 
4.1. The Genealogy of Wilsonianism: Exceptionalism 
In the following, I will look into exceptionalism, since essential exceptional ideas is adopted 
in Wilsonianism, imprinting the latter with an arrogant mode of conviction (Pedersen; 
2003; 221).  
 
Exceptionalism, as argued by Pedersen, derived from Puritanism. American Puritanism 
taught the ’(…) doctrine of universality, yet served to establish particularity.’ (Pedersen; 
2003; 215). At the time of the settlers, America was seen to be a particular nation, different 
from the Old World, Europe, from where the settlers had emigrated. ‘God had chosen this 
place to plant his people in.’ (Madsen; 1998; 19), feeding to a discourse of dichotomies, thus 
articulating upon the ‘chosen’ versus the ‘fallen’, the ‘good’ versus the ‘evil’.  
 As the ‘chosen’ nation, America was the New World of immense potential to fulfil 
God’s ‘call’ upon his people. Thus, Puritanism encouraged its members to ’(…) progress on 
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the part of humanity.’ (Pedersen; 2003; 215). As a Christian religious sect, it proclaimed 
success as a sign of saviour from God, and adversity as a sign of damnation.    
 Exceptionalism drew upon the puritan thought of universality, which legitimized 
its leadership, assigning it a divine purpose (Madsen; 1998; 21). But exceptionalism 
extended beyond the religious, transforming the puritan ‘call’ inside its own closed system, 
into a narrative of ‘moving on’, suggesting limitless human progress instead of achievement 
within the puritan spatiality (Pedersen; 2003; 217). Exceptionalism, thus, defined America 
as being on an ‘errand into the wilderness’, meaning that America, destined to transform 
into a model nation, was the more advanced, the more ahead, as such was due to progress 
and extend itself spatially, civilizing the uncivilized world, being the ‘redeemer nation’ 
(Madsen; 1998; 3, 13, 23). As such, this understanding has led to an American self-
narrative along the temporal dimension; What is ‘American’ is universal and achieved. As a 
consequence, the Puritan ‘call’ upon America was by exceptionalism interpreted as spatial 
progression, due to the achievement of American temporal progression of civilization, 
principles and values (Campbell; 1998;132).  
 
This exceptional doctrin of being on an ‘errand’, moving on to ‘redeem’ the world, was 
employed in Wilsonianism, where America is narrated and legitimized as the ‘crusader’ of 
universal principles. As outlined, to Wilson, democratic and liberal principles were not 
merely American principles, but principles of ‘mankind’, and as such, formed a concrete 
goal of progress; To spread liberalism and democracy worldwide, in obtaining fulfilment of, 
what may be interpreted as, it’s Godly ‘call’ (Pedersen; 2003; 221).  
 Wilson understood that liberal democratic principles was inherent to all nations 
of the world, whereby America was exceptional in that it was the more advanced having 
achieved realization of the universal principles in temporal terms (Pedersen; 2003; 220). 
Wilsonianism, thus places the ‘call’ of American progression in the spatial realm, while 
American values and principles is understood as universal or stasis. Progress, then, is only 
possible in the spatial dimension, the outspreading of the universal principles beyond 
spatial borders, and not in terms of temporality, since American principles were 
unchangeable. Consequently, in the exceptional legacy inherent to Wilsonianism, American 
identity is bound up on it being on an ‘errand’. However, the American ‘errand’ of 
extending its principles through to the ‘wilderness’ of world, has a natural end, an inherent 
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telos; The end of history, when no spatial entity is left outside what is ‘American’ 
(Pedersen; 2003; 219-220). The problem for Wilsonianism, and why this is important in 
the present rapport, is this inherent telos and the prospect of accomplishment of the 
American mission. America needs history not to end. 
 Thus, the American mission needs not to be achieved, which brings the 
discussion to the construction of Others and the use of securitization. By way of 
securitization, constructing new existential threats and a ‘wilderness’ of non-Others to 
redeem, America is creating a ‘(…) space for (…) redemption’ and is thus, generating a 
possibility to reproduce its identity as a ‘crusader nation’ (Pedersen; 2003; 222).  
 
 
5. Analysis: Reproducing American Identity 
Concerning my thesis, in the present section I seek to show that there has been a discursive 
change with the shift in presidential office; That American identity has changed into being 
less arrogant towards its self-appointed crusade. The analysis is thus constructed to 
support this thesis, showing analytical examples to justify its claimed truth. 
  
5.1. The Empirical Research Field 
The analysis will be based on texts from the respective administrations of Bush and Obama. 
Considering the size and capability of this rapport, I have restricted the empirical field to 
texts only, being aware of the limitations provided by this choice. To support the textual 
analysis and it’s finding, it would have been rewarding to examine the practical foreign 
political conductions in relation to the discursive promises and ambitions, since they may 
likely differ from one another. The choice of text over practice is done with regard to Lene 
Hansen and David Campbell, both arguing that identity is a construction of discursive 
practice and can as such be examined within a textual analysis.  
 
5.1.1. Choice of Texts: State of the Union 
Various textual genres are at disposal to the analyst concerned with foreign policy 
discourse and state identity representations. However, three criteria are to be met: The 
texts should clearly articulate identities and policies; They should be widely read and 
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attended to; They should have formal authority to define a political position (Hansen; 
2006; 85). Hansen advocates employing State of the Union speeches, since this type of text 
meets all three criteria.  
 Being an address to the public and the international community from the 
President in office, a State of the Union speech is authoritative and clearly expresses the 
political views of the presidential administration and the state identity it envisions. 
 I have strived towards citing both presidents from a wide range of their speeches 
in order to give a broad perspective on how they each produce American identity. An 
analysis upon change of articulation, within the respective presidential speeches, would 
have added to the strength of argument, but giving the main focus of the present rapport 
and the pages provided for it, I have decided to look at the presidential speeches as two 
respectively coherent discourses. I will argue that this limitation is acceptable in that the 
speeches, when looked upon separately, according to each President, represent the war on 
terror in coherent terms. The rationale behind my choice has been to build and explicate 
my findings upon a broader textual foundation, but in a simple and coherent presentation 
to enable a comparative analysis without unnecessary complexity.  
 
5.2. Research Design 
This project is a comparative research. It considers the differences between the identity 
discursively constructed by the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration. Thus, 
this project is dealing with two discourses, both of which produces an American Self that 
will be studied separately, later to be compared. Thereby, of concern is the American Self, 
constructed within the Bush discourse and within the Obama discourse, which are dealt 
with in two separate sections. 
  Furthermore, this study is set in a historical development; It concerns the time 
span from initiating war on terror until the political climate of today. The analysis is 
concerned with a single issue, that of the war on terror. Within this single issue, this 
rapport considers the development in the reproduction of American identity from 2002, 
when Bush spoke his first State of the Union speech after 9/11, until the latest speech of 
Obama in 2012.   
 As outlined earlier, this choice of case is made because of the public anticipations 
that flourished at the inauguration of president Obama. With the shift from a republican 
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government to a democratic government, a change in discourse and identity was publicly 
anticipated.2 Thus, as presented in section 3, the research questions, framing the analysis, 
are as follows: 
• Which Self and Other, and the web of signs respectively linked thereto? 
• How radical is the difference between the Self and Other? 
• How is difference constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical 
identity? 
 These questions will appear in the first part of each analytical section, thus 
concerning the radical Other and the non-Other. After having an exemplified American self-
narrative, as an analytical starting point, I have strived to analyse the construction of the 
radical Other, separate from the non-Other, in relation to their web of signs and in relation 
to the Self. The three dimensions will not be examined separately or in a particular order. 
Rather, I will emphasize the dimensions if and how they contribute to the reproduction of 
identity, aiming to keep a natural analytical flow.   
 Following, the analysis will take its form starting with the question of 
securitization, interplaying, as I will show, with the particular constructions of the Self and 
the Others, specifically where a radical ‘danger’ is constructed as an existential threat. 
Continuously, I will trace the basic discourse of Wilsonianism in relation to securitization 
or non-securitization. This is done in order to suggest how the Wilsonian discourse 
interplay with securitization in respect to which Wilsonian aspects are being emphasized 
by securitization or the absence of it.    
 A complete separation of the analytical sections, outlined above, would seem too 
constructed, and thus, I have made indications of connections between the different 
analytical aspects, where I found it natural.     
 
On the state of the Union, Bush and Obama speaks on behalf of the Government 
representing the American State and Nation. Of present interest is how the presidents 
discursively reproduce the American Self by constructing the Others in relation to the war 
                                                        
2 http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-05/politics/labott.foreign.policy_1_barack-obama-
obamamania-obama-administration?_s=PM:POLITICS  
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on terror, and I will seek to support my thesis by documenting a change, in American 
identity, towards a self-narrative of a less ‘crusader nation’.  
 I will term the articulations and constructions, respectively made by Bush and 
Obama, the Bush discourse and the Obama discourse, for the purpose of comparing them in 
the conclusion. This is however a discursive construction on my behalf, in order to make 
the comparison more clear to the reader. 
 
5.3. Analytical Section 1: Foreign Policy Discourse of President Bush 
The following analytical section is based upon the State of the Union Speeches, made by 
President Bush from 2002-2008. His speech in 2001 is not included since it went prior to 
the terrorist attack on 9/11. 
  
5.3.1. The Construction of the Radical Other 
‘We want to be a nation that serves goals rather than self. (…) America will lead by defending 
liberty and justice because it is right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.’ 
(Bush; 2002). 
 
What is noticeable, when reading through Bush’s speeches on the state of the Union, is the 
explicit vision of an ‘America’ that serves goals extensive to national interests, as the above 
citation is expressing. Considering the signs identified with the American Self, ‘server of 
goals rather than self’, ‘defender of liberty and justice’, ‘right’, ‘true’, ‘unchanging’, what 
constitutes its web of signs is suggestive of the American ‘call’ for service, here concerned 
allegedly universal principles and values. Thus, these principles and values that America is 
fighting for, are not limited to what is ‘American’ in spatial terms. The above exemplifies 
the way that Bush refrains from defining American identity in spatial terms. What 
constitutes that which is ‘American’ is seemingly not confined to its spatiality of territory. 
This discursive conduct is in line with the fundamental assumption about American self-
narrative; That America defines itself along the temporal rather than the spatial dimension 
(Pedersen; 2003; 214).  
 
As Campbell suggests, the decisive element in the reproduction of identity is the 
construction of the Other (Campbell; 1998; 91).  As we have seen, the universality of 
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American principles suggests that ‘America’ can be found or at least implemented outside 
American territorial borders.  Thus, in order to reproduce the American identity, what the 
Self is not, is imperative to articulate.  
 Bush constructs several Others and distances these in relation to the Self. The 
general construction of the radical Others, in the Bush discourse, are articulated as the 
‘enemies of freedom’ (Bush; 2006), spatially constructed as the Al Qaida, who is also linked 
to terms like ‘madness’, ‘dangerous killers’ and ‘parasites’ (Bush; 2002). Furthermore, Bush 
articulates an alliance between the terrorists and the ‘outlaw’ regimes that support them, 
like the ‘Iraqi regime’, and links the alliance to the phrase ‘the axis of evil’ (Bush; 2002). ‘Our 
(…) goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America and our friends 
and allies. (…) States like these (Iran, Iraq) and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world.’ (Bush; 2002).  
 Bush constructs the radical enemies, the Al Qaida and the ‘outlaw’ regimes, into a 
spatial entity of ‘the axis of evil’. The differentiation between the web of the signs, linked to 
this conjoint radical Other, that is ‘the axis of evil’, and the Self, is what reproduces a 
dimensionally complex construction of American identity in relation to the radical Other:  
 Concerning temporality, ‘the axis of evil’, is as such, the opposite of American 
universalism, reminiscent of the puritan dichotomy of the ‘chosen’ versus the ‘fallen’ 
(Madsen; 1998; 19). ‘The axis of evil’, constitutive of the radical Other, is in temporal terms 
implicitly constructed as incapable of change, lost in ‘evil’ conviction (Bush; 2002). Thus, a 
prospect of reconciliation between the Self and the radical Other is impossible due to the 
temporal natures of the two; the American Self being of universal quality, thus divine and 
unchanging and ‘the axis of evil’ equally stagnated in temporal terms, but of wrong 
convictions. 
 The relation between the Self and the radical Other is also articulated in terms of 
responsibility, which is indicative of the ethical dimension. In constructing the radical 
enemies into a single radical Other, ‘the axis of evil’, the responsibility of the one, is the 
responsibility of the Other. Consider the following: ‘(…) radical Islam – the perversion by a 
few of a noble faith into an ideology of death and terror. Terrorists like bin Laden (…) seek to 
impose a heartless system of totalitarian control throughout the Middle East and arm 
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themselves with weapons of mass murder’ (Bush; 2006).3 The radical Islam, here suggestive 
of ‘the axis of evil’, is allegedly responsible of ‘death’, ‘terror’, ‘totalitarian control’, ‘tyranny’ 
and ‘mass murder’. In other words, the terrorist and the ‘outlaw’ regimes share this 
responsibility, a construction that will not be seen in the Obama discourse. Bush further on 
clarifies the American ‘call’, that is the very conquering of this ‘evil’ enemy and to save the 
innocent victims, thus bringing peace to the world: ’(…) we accept the call of history to 
deliver the oppressed and move this world toward peace.’ (Bush; 2006). By applying a shared 
responsibility upon the entirety of the radical Other, ‘the axis of evil’, and by declaring the 
American accept of ‘the call of history’, the American Self can be reproduced as the 
‘redeemer nation’, due to the constructed incitement to redeem and deliver the 
‘wilderness’ of the ‘less civilized’ world.  
 
5.3.2. The Non-Other  
As we have seen, the only way to deal with a lost, unchangeable enemy of radical Islam is 
‘elimination’ (Bush; 2005). This temporal character, however, is not applied to the entirety 
of the Islamic world. Bush is differentiating between the radical Other of radical Islam, 
constituent of  ‘the axis of evil’, and the non-Other of the Islamic world, the latter being the 
innocent victims of terrorism an deaths brought on by the radical Other. This 
differentiation is a functional discursive construction, since it provides an opportunity to 
deliver someone, the ‘innocent’, from something, ‘evil’, thereby instigating further the 
reproduction of American identity as a ‘redeemer nation’. Thus following, Bush articulates 
the non-Other: ‘We will (…) encourage development and education and opportunity in the 
Islamic world.’ (Bush; 2002). What the above citation shows, is that the Islamic world, the 
non-Other, is capable of change in contrast to the articulated character of the radical Other. 
What is noticeable, is Bush’s construction of the non-Other as one entity, like his 
articulation of the radical Other, both of which, we shall see, deviates from the Obama 
discourse.  
 Also to note is the lack of applied responsibility: ‘Our goal is a democratic Iraq 
that upholds the rule of law, respects the rights of its people, provides the security, and is an 
ally in the war on terror.‘ (Bush; 2007). It can be argued that the above quote is 
                                                        
3 The ’noble faith’ mentioned here, I interpret as the ‘conventional Islam’ as opposed to the ‘radical Islam’. 
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exemplifying that Bush is applying responsibility upon the non-Other, Iraq. However, Bush 
is articulating on the present American goal, and is merely suggestive of a future 
responsibility assigned to the Iraqi Government, thus refraining from applying upon it a 
present responsibility. I argue that the Islamic world is not assigned responsible for 
development, education, respecting human rights, providing security, etc. Rather, the 
Islamic World is dependent on American ‘crusade’ to convert it, enabling progress and 
redemption within its region. Thus, Bush is constructing a ‘ranking of progress’4, meaning 
that this ranking suggests the progress in realizing the universal ethics. The American Self, 
having the privilege of being a ‘chosen’ nation, realizing the universal principles, is 
positioned above any other nation and value-system, suggesting that America has 
progressed to its fulfilment in temporal terms. In the articulation above, Bush indicates that 
the Islamic world needs to be converted by America, and as such, Bush is implying the need 
of American ‘crusade’ in order to help way of progress.  
 
5.3.3. The Connection Between Securitization and Wilsonianism 
The spatial construction of the radical Other and the non-Other, as we have seen, has 
functional value in relation to securitization. As Campbell points out, ‘(…) space is a defining 
moment of American identity.’ (Campbell; 1998; 132). This point, seemingly contradictory 
to the suggestion, that America defines itself in temporal terms, suggests that American 
progression and change can only unfold in the spatial dimension. Since American values 
and principles are viewed as universal givens, the natural consequence has been the 
interpretation of the American ‘call’ as ‘spatial expansion’ rather than ‘temporal 
progression’ (Campbell; 1992; 132).  
 An American identity, defined as universal in temporal terms, presents a problem 
for actual military securitization; Bush needs to construct a spatial enemy of the radical 
Other in order to legitimize a military securitization. The discursive construction, Bush 
giving spatiality to the radical ‘danger’ of terrorism, by constructing its conductors into ‘the 
axis of evil’, is functional due to the fact that terrorism has no fixed territorial nature. By 
linking terrorists, the conductors of terrorism, to a territorially fixed spatial Other, such as 
a regime confined to a particular state or nation, actual military measures can be utilized, 
                                                        
4 Own construction of term. 
 25
making terrorism a military target of territorial character. The issue of terrorism can thus 
be securitized within the military sector (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 49 ff).  
 Recalling the exceptional narrative of ‘moving on’, suggesting limitless human 
progress, and since American progression can only be achieved in the spatial realm, 
constructing a radical ‘danger’ as an existential threat, legitimizing securitization, serves as 
a tool to make history go on, enabling a realization of  ‘spatial expansion’, as the ‘call’ is 
interpreted, and reproducing American identity as a ‘crusader nation’. In order to 
reproduce American identity as the ‘elected’, ‘redeemer nation’, Bush constructs the radical 
Other, ‘the axis of evil’, as an existential threat, drawing upon the dichotomy of Puritanism 
inherent to exceptional discourse, as already implied. This existential threat is what 
legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures.  In fact, as the security argument goes: ‘(…) 
the peace that we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed 
radicalism and ideologies of murder.’ (Bush; 2005).  
 As indicated earlier, Bush applies a shared responsibility upon the terrorist and 
the ‘outlaw’ regimes by constructing them into one spatial entity, ‘the axis of evil’. The 
emerged spatiality of the existential threat of terrorism enables actual military 
securitization. Destruction of this conjoint radical Other is the only solution, due to its 
unchanging character. This enemy cannot be coerced with merely political measures. Thus, 
with the security argument that, if America does not securitize, peace will be unachievable, 
the conduction of ‘necessity’ is constructed as the military measures, responsibly taken on 
by America (Byzan, Wæver, de Wilde; 1998; 50).  
 As such, the security argument can be considered indicative of particular 
Wilsonian aspects as it calls upon American universalism. Advocating universal principles 
rather than self-interest, the military securitization initiated by America is not merely of 
American interests, but rather, it is for the good of the world, as Bush declares: ‘We are the 
nation that saved liberty (…) helped raise up democracies (…) we accept the call of history to 
deliver the oppressed and move this world toward peace.’ (Bush; 2006). America takes upon 
its ‘call’ to prevent human suffering, thus legitimizing the American crusade for universal 
values.  Furthermore, Bush reproduces the Wilsonian vision of democratic world peace: 
‘Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of citizens and their 
neighbours (…)’ (Bush; 2006). Thus, the securitization against terrorism is implicitly 
legitimized in highly Wilsonian terms; The valuation of democracy as the less predatory 
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state organisation, bringing prospects for world peace and liberalism, all signs linked to the 
American Self in the Bush discourse (Smith;2012; 88-89).  
 Bush speaks into the Wilsonian discourse in order to legitimize his initiative of 
war on terror in the spatial realm of Iraq and Afghanistan, differentiating between the 
radical Other and the non-Other; The latter which is promised salvation and deliverance 
when converting, enabled by the American ‘crusade’; The former declared upon it a 
necessity of termination. This construction enables America to fulfil its role as a ‘crusader’ 
and ‘redeemer nation’, setting into practice its ‘errand into the wilderness’ of the world 
(Madsen; 1998; 23).  
 
We have seen that Bush emphasizes certain aspects of Wilsonianism. Bush uses the spatial 
construction of the radical Other and the non-Other to securitize and has thus, reproduces 
American identity in relation to power and military capacity. The identity emerging from 
the Bush discourse is thus suggestive of American leadership, hegemony and American 
sovereign power, al drawing from Wilsonianism; ‘(…) This great republic will lead the cause 
of freedom.’ (Bush; 2004). Exceptionalist ideas, inherent to Wilsonianism, are frequently 
used implicitly, here in an explicit security argument on what will happen if America does 
nothing; ‘The only alternative to American leadership is a dramatically more dangerous and 
anxious world.’ (Bush; 2006). Thus, the exceptional view, that America is fulfilling its 
destiny and ‘call’ of spatially ‘moving on’, is implied in the urgency of securitization.  
 
‘I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom.’ (Bush; 
2004).  
 Bush appears to have adopted a Wilsonian arrogance, expressing inconvertible 
belief in the universality of American principles of democracy and liberty and its 
unequivocal prevalence world wide, thus taking American ethics for granted (Pedersen; 
2003; 219). However, this claimed Wilsonian arrogance in the Bush discourse, could be 
argued against, since Bush also articulates that American leadership is not merely a God-
giving, but also of a matter of choice: ‘(…) we also choose to lead because it is a privilege to 
serve the values that gave us birth.’ (Bush; 2006). America is here presented as actively 
choosing to follow the values from which America has emerged. Thus, these values must be 
interpreted as inherent to American identity and destiny. The exceptional perception of 
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America as the ‘elect’ leader is different from the perception of American leadership caused 
by human choice. Here, Bush interestingly articulates both; That America is also choosing 
to follow its destiny. However, considering the profound reminiscence of exceptionalist 
thinking, already emphasized, I will argue that the above quote does not devalue the 
suggestion of a Wilsonian arrogance in the Bush discourse; Bush is not expressing that 
American values are human constructions. Rather, they are literally taken for granted as 
universal truths, giving Bush’s valuation of power and military capacity over ethics, due to 
the reasoning that American conduct is being universally right. In short, Bush is taking 
American ethics for granted.  
  
What we have seen in the analysis so far have been highly indicative of Wilsonian 
arrogance towards the universally implementable quality and prevalence of American 
principles, giving America incitement to ‘crusade’, thus fulfilling its ‘call’, interpreted as 
‘spatial expansion’, and thereby, reproducing American identity likewise.    
 To take a critical stance of my finding, Bush does indicate a more diplomatic view 
regarding the non-Other, in expressing that ‘America and Afghanistan are now allies against 
terror.’ (Bush; 2002). However, recalling the construction of ‘ranking of progress’, Bush 
does not construct this non-Other as an equal.  
 Likewise, in 2008, Bush emphasizes the new mission of American troops in Iraq: 
’(…) work with the Iraqi forces’ (Bush; 2008). Pre-conditioning this initiative, the Iraqi 
people have ‘realized’ the good of American intentions and the work that the American 
troops are providing. It is clear that this realization, of the Iraqi nation, is alone due to the 
Iraqi conversion spiralled by the American ‘crusade’. Both examples suggests, that the 
American willingness to form an alliance is based on the ability of this non-Other to 
implement democratic and liberal principles, in short, to convert to American principles. It 
is thus not suggestive of a loosening of arrogant conviction.   
  
In the following, the Obama discourse is examined. I will emphasize the differences 
regarding the constructions of the radical Other and the non-Other, specifically concerned 
the function of these constructions compared to Bush, who used these Others in order to 
reproduce American identity as the superior ‘elect nation’, legitimizing American crusade 
worldwide. Furthermore, I will seek to underline the difference in the undertaking of 
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Wilsonianism, and show that Obama is not adopting Wilsonian arrogance to the same 
degree as Bush.   
 
5.4. Analytical Section 2: Foreign Policy Discourse of President Obama 
Regarding the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, it was publicly expected that the shift in 
presidential office, to a democratic administration, would bring about a new American ‘face 
to the world’.5 Already in 2009, the war in Iraq was coming to an end. Therefore, the 
construction of radical Others and non-Others are mostly expressed in relation to 
Afghanistan (Obama; 2009). The Obama analysis will therefore mainly concern the Others 
spatially linked to Afghanistan.   
 The following analysis is based on the State of the Union speeches of Obama from 
2009-2012. 
 
5.4.1. Defining ‘America’: Constructing the Radical Other 
Speaking of the Union’s 220 years of history Obama declares: ‘It’s tempting to look back on 
these moments (prosperity and tranquillity, war, depression, strife and struggle) and 
assume that our progress was inevitable, that America was always destined to succeed. (…) 
These were the times that tested the courage of our convictions and the strength of our Union. 
And despite all of our divisions and disagreements, our hesitations and our fears, America 
prevailed because we chose to move forward as one Nation, as one people. Again we are 
tested. And again, we must answer history’s call.’ (Obama; 2010).  
 
Recalling the assumption, that America defines itself in temporal rather than spatial terms, 
the above quote presents an interesting finding. In the Bush discourse, we see clear 
expressions of the universality in what is ‘American’; That American principles are 
essentially inherent to all humans and cultures. In the above citation, Obama comments on 
this notion of American universality. The signs linked to the American Self are ‘progress’, 
‘courage’, ‘strength’, and implicitly, ’prevalence’ and ‘unity’; What Obama implies is that 
America is not destined to succeed, but rather that American prevalence have been realized 
due to the strong union of its people. Equally interesting is his expression of ‘moving 
                                                        
5 http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-05/politics/labott.foreign.policy_1_barack-obama-
obamamania-obama-administration?_s=PM:POLITICS  
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forward’, suggestive of American development. Considering the assumption, mentioned 
above, this movement is likely of a spatial nature, and looking closer upon this Obama 
articulation, American ‘convictions’ are not questioned, which is suggestive of their 
perceived universal character (Obama; 2010). 
 What is noticeable in Obama’s construction of the American Self is the emphasis 
on inclusion. In relation to the articulated universality of American principles, the 
American Self is giving spatiality by expressing inclusions of spatial groups into what is 
American: ‘We will stand for the rights and dignity of all human beings: men and women; 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews.’ (Obama; 2012). In this manner however, Obama stresses his 
strong belief in the universality of ‘America’.     
 
‘History’s call’, as Obama speaks of, is about overcoming adversities. Among these are 
outcomes from the war on terror (Obama; 2010). As mentioned, this vision of ‘overcoming’ 
needs an enemy, something to overcome.  
 Regarding the war on terror in Afghanistan, the Others being articulated in 
Obama’s 2011 speech, are the Afghan people, the Afghan Government, the Taliban and Al 
Qaida. In contrast to Bush, Obama constructs two separate radical Others, however related; 
The Taliban and the Al Qaida. The Taliban regime is being opposed and directly conjoint in 
a relation with the radical ‘danger’, the terrorists behind the terror attack on 9/11, as 
explicated in the following statement: ‘(…) as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within 
our borders, we are responding. (…) By preventing the Taliban from establishing a 
stranglehold over the Afghan people, we will deny Al Qaida the safe haven that served as a 
launching pad for 9/11.’ (Obama: 2011). The two radical Others are respectively linked to 
the signs ‘extremists’, ‘violence’ and ‘stranglehold’. The quotation above, suggests that the 
two radical Others are giving their spatial differentiation from a rather ethical perspective; 
The placement of responsibility. The existential threat, articulated here, is terrorism, 
conducted by the terrorists of Al Qaida. However, Obama relates the terrorists to the 
Taliban regime, having served as a ‘launching pad’ for the terrorist attack in 2001 (Obama; 
2011). 
 In the Bush discourse, the terrorists and the ‘outlaw’ regimes are constructed 
into an alliance, ‘the axis of evil’ (Bush; 2002), giving a shared responsibility. Obama 
applies two separate responsibilities upon the respective radical Others. Thus, Obama is 
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placing responsibility of terrorism upon the terrorists. While Bush links this responsibility 
to the entirety of ‘the axis of evil’, Obama differentiates, and places another responsibility 
upon the Taliban regime; The suppression of innocents, the Afghan people, and the 
responsibility of not being a ‘launching pad’ for attacks (Obama; 2011). I will argue that 
there is a significant difference between articulating the two radical Others, sharing 
responsibility as one entity, and constructing the one Other as a prolific condition to the 
second Other. Thus, in the latter case, as indicated, the responsibility of the one Other, the 
Taliban, is merely being the prolific condition of the second Other, the terrorists. Thereby, 
the Taliban is not held directly responsible for the conductions of the terrorists, as they are 
in the Bush discourse. As we shall see later, this discursive move is a decisive difference, 
between the two presidential discourses, concerning securitization.  
 
5.4.2. The Non-Other 
Alongside the articulations on the separate radical Others, Obama constructs the non-
Others, those of the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. While the people of 
Afghanistan are constructed as innocent victims of the ‘stranglehold’ regimes (Obama; 
2011), the Afghan Government is interestingly applied responsibility, as Obama expresses: 
‘There will be tough fighting ahead, and the Afghan Government will need to deliver better 
governance.’ (Obama; 2009). As with the separation of the two radical Others, applied two 
different responsibilities, Obama equally constructs two non-Others in separate manner.  
 Recalling the Bush discourse, the non-Other encompasses the innocent people 
along with the governments, thus constructed as one entity as the Islamic world. Bush is 
hereby inclined to apply the same level of progress towards both the Islamic governments 
and the people of Islam, and, more importantly, he articulates them both as innocents, 
denying them any responsibility or capacity, due to his discursive lack of differentiation 
between the two. Returning to the Obama discourse, the articulated temporality of the 
Afghan Government is suggestive of a changeable nature. The Afghan Government has the 
ability to progress into a better Government, fulfilling the applied responsibility of not 
being a ‘launching pad’ for terrorism: ‘(…) we will build an enduring partnership with 
Afghanistan so that it is never again a source of attacks against America.’ (Obama; 2012). 
Obama seems to suggest that American involvement is key to Afghan success and progress. 
This point is also an expressive element in the Bush discourse, recalling the ‘ranking of 
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progress’.  However, Bush is articulating a vision of conversion of the Islamic world, clearly 
suggesting its backwardness compared to American self-achievement in temporal terms 
(Bush; 2002). Deviant, in the above, Obama is expressing the vision of partnership rather 
than ‘crusade’, thus not indicating ideological backwardness, but rather a common ground 
for sharing principles and values.     
 To elaborate further on the discursive differences in relation to ‘the ranking of 
progress’, Obama is generally speaking of American responsibility to help rebuilding the 
states fallen victim of the ‘violence’ and ‘strangleholds’ of the radical Other, that of the 
Taliban regime (Obama; 2011). This could also indicate a ranking of progression, placing 
America on top, as we have seen in Bush’s speeches. However, Obama’s suggestion of this 
American responsibility seems a fair reasoning, since American troops have been present 
in Afghanistan, contributing to destruction of territory as a consequence of ‘necessary’ 
violent missions. Furthermore, the above quote can arguably be interpreted as being 
implicit on that Obama differentiates between the suppressive regimes, and the will and 
values of the nation, being suppressed by the former. Thus, the nations are not assigned 
ideological backwardness, since their visions, identifiable with universal American values, 
have merely been suppressed. The very fact, that Obama places a responsibility upon the 
American Self, is deviant from the Bush discourse. Without any responsibility of this kind, 
Bush can construct the ‘ranking of progress’, as this ranking suggests the progress of 
realizing the universal ethics. By placing responsibility upon the American Self, 
equalization between the Self and the non-Other of the Afghan Government is constructed 
in ethical terms; ‘We’re working with Muslim communities around the world to promote 
science and education and development.’ (Obama; 2010).   
 
5.4.3. Securitizing Against Terrorism? 
Returning to the construction of the radical Other, which in the Bush discourse is enabling 
a securitization by identifying the radical Other with an existential threat. Bush constructs 
‘the axis of evil’, which transforms an Other of equal temporal stasis, into a spatial military 
target. In the Obama discourse, responsibility is separated, thus, Obama cannot legitimize a 
counter attack on the grounds of terrorism upon the suppressive regime. The argument, 
raised by the Bush Administration, of initiating war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
is build upon in the Obama discourse; While terrorism may be implied as an existential 
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threat, times have changed and terrorists are no more threatening the existence of the 
American Self: ‘(…) Osama Bin Laden is no longer a threat to this country. (…) we will build 
an enduring partnership with Afghanistan so that it is never again a source of attacks against 
America.’ (Obama; 2012). On the war on terror in Afghanistan, what is emphasized here is 
partnership to prevent a future existential threat of terrorism. Military measures, being 
perceived as the only solution, is thus, not constructed by Obama. This is due to the 
articulated dimensional nature of the radical Other, the existential threat of terrorism; In 
contrast to the Bush’s construction, ‘the axis of evil’ as the spatiality of this existential 
threat, terrorism has no spatial dimension in the Obama discourse.   
 Recalling the assumption of America, being emphatic on ‘spatial expansion’ due 
to its self-achievement in the temporal dimension, this is differently expressed in the two 
presidential discourses. Bush securitizes in the military sector, reproducing American 
identity with emphasis on power and military capacity, while Obama does not securitize, 
due to the absence of a spatial radical Other as an existential threat. The lack of a spatial 
dimension linked to the radical Other hinders a securitization within the military sector, 
since Obama has no construction of a military target. This discursive element is part of 
Obama’s expressed emphasis on partnership and cooperation, rather than power and 
military capacity.  
  
In his securitization, Bush is largely drawing upon exceptionalism in its dichotomous 
constructions of the Self and the radical Other. As I have claimed, the Bush discourse 
suggests America as the ‘chosen’, while ‘the axis of evil’ is portrayed as the ‘fallen’, thus 
reproducing America as a redeeming ‘crusader nation’, the exceptional convictions 
interplaying with the securitization. The discourse of exceptionalism, constructing America 
as the ‘crusader’, is not equally explicit in the Obama discourse, supported by his refrain 
from constructing a securitization. While standing firm on the universality of American 
principles, as we saw in relation to the constructed non-Others being of the same 
convictions, Obama portrays an America, which is counting on partnership, rather than 
military superiority. As is now suggested there is a lack of Wilsonian arrogance in the 
Obama discourse. Thus, in the following I will seek to clarify Obama’s Wilsonian inclusions. 
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5.4.4. Obama and Wilsonianism  
Recalling the temporality and spatiality of the reproduced American identity, explicated by 
Obama, what dominates the American self-narrative in the Obama discourse is the union of 
differences, both regarding what constitutes the American nation, in spatial terms, but also 
in relation the non-Others outside its spatial borders:  ‘We will stand for the rights and 
dignity of all human beings: men and women; Christians, Muslims, and Jews. We will support 
our policies that lead to strong and stable democracies and open markets, because tyranny is 
no match for liberty.’ (Obama; 2012). On display here, is the universality of American 
principles of freedom, liberty and democracy, that in the Obama discourse seem to apply 
across spatial identities, such as gender and religious belief. This is strongly indicative of a 
Wilsonian conviction, specifically regarding Wilson’s vision of international democratic 
peace and partnership (Smith; 1994; 88-89). Thus, reminiscent of Wilsonianism, America, 
lead by Obama, is seeking to promote ‘regional peace and prosperity.’ (Obama; 2010). 
Obama is clearly defining American leadership, inherent to Wilsionianism, and the values 
of the American Self. Furthermore, considering the citations above, Obama implies a strog 
belief in the universal applicability of American principles, as also suggested with his 
regard of the non-Others, being ideologically equal to ‘America’, due to their shared 
convictions. Obama is thus, legitimately and in good faith, constituting partnerships on the 
background of the common convictions and submission to the ‘universal’ principles.  
 This could be indicative of the same Wilsonian arrogance that was explicit in the 
Bush discourse. I would however argue against this view, considering the following: ’(…) 
while it’s ultimately up to the people of the region to decide their fate, we will advocate for 
those values that have served our own country so well.’ (Obama; 2012). This is not 
expressive of Wilsonian arrogance. Rather, Obama is emphasizing his ‘respect for 
nationalism’, as Wilson also advocated (Smith; 2012; 88-89). Obama is balancing the 
exceptionalist view, held in traditional Wilsonianism, of the unquestionable universality of 
American principles along with a more humble comprehension of American leadership. 
Specifically, Obama shows insight to America’s own limitations of power. Thus, while 
articulating a firm conviction in the universality in American principles, Obama also 
explicates a respect to the sovereignty and choices of other nations, which is indicative of 
an acknowledgement of the ‘limits of American power’ (Smith; 2012; 379).  
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 While reproducing American identity as a leader concerning universal principles, 
Obama’s avocations are less about American hegemonic leadership, in relation to power 
and military capacity, and America being the ‘chosen’ nation, legitimizing American 
crusade, and more about partnership, however lead on by America. As expressed by 
Obama: ‘(…) what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose 
behind it.’ (Obama; 2011). Bush values power over ethics, due to his view of American 
ethics as a precondition of American conduct. Contrarily, the ‘purpose’ is in the Obama 
discourse giving highest value, which suggests a view of not taking American ethics for 
granted. Rather, Obama indicates that American ethics have previously not recurrently 
played the decisive role in American foreign policy, as Obama believes it should.  
 Obama does not adopt Wilsonian arrogance and he does not securitize in relation 
to the war on terror, which indicates a different emphasize on Wilsonianism. Thus, Obama 
is reproducing an American identity different from Bush.  
 
 
6. Conclusion: Comparing the Bush Discourse and the Obama Discourse 
The thesis, that I have sought to emphasize throughout the discourse analysis above, is that 
American identity has developed from Bush to Obama, and that this development has 
moved towards America thinking of itself as the ‘crusader nation’ to a lesser degree. 
 My approach towards answering the main problem has been to examine the 
degree of Wilsonianism in each discourse, which have brought about an analysis of the 
construction of the radical Other, the non-Other and thus, questioning whether 
securitization against these was conducted.  
 
Bush articulates the American Self from the construction of a radical Other, being incapable 
of change. With American identity being reproduced as temporarily self-achieved, by 
constructing one encompassing non-Other, exempted from responsibility due to it being 
less progressed, and by constructing ‘the axis of evil’, representing the one radical Other as 
an existential threat, a military securitization is legitimized. In contrast to Bush, Obama 
refrains from securitizing regarding the radical Other, as he does not construct terrorists 
and ‘outlaw’ regimes into one radical Other, sharing responsibility. Thus, the existential 
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threat of terrorism is not giving spatiality. This enables his emphasis on partnership rather 
than power and military capacity.  
 Also different from Bush, Obama does not construct a ‘ranking of progress’. By 
applying responsibility to the American Self, not taking ethics for granted, and by 
differentiating between the innocents, not applied any responsible, and the Afghan 
Government, assigned responsibility, Obama indicates a believe in their level of ideological 
progress equal to that of America.  
 
The two discourses both adopt Wilsonianism, but to a different degree regarding the 
various aspects inherent to this ideology.  
 Bush articulated the American leadership and hegemonic status as a God-giving. 
This discourse is inherent of the Wilsonian arrogance. While strongly believing in the 
universality of American principles, Obama is more emphatic on the Wilsonian vision of 
partnership worldwide. The Wilsonian ‘respect for nationalities’ is explicit in this 
discourse, with Obama including spatial groups in what is ‘American’, along with the 
valuation of ethics above power, thereby acknowledging that America’s power, to 
implement the universal principles outside its borders, is limited. 
 Thus, while both discourses draw from Wilsonianism, in that they both have a 
vision of American leadership, as of its principles being spread worldwide due to the their 
universal character, Obama have adopted a more diplomatic form of Wilsonianism having 
realized its limitations in real political practice and not taking American values for granted 
in valuing ethics over power.  
 These realizations of American leadership and limitations, regarding American 
‘crusader’ identity, on behalf of Obama, supports my thesis, that from Bush to Obama, 
American identity has changed into being that of a less ‘crusading’ nation.     
 
6.1. A New Perspective: Obama Employing the Bush Discourse 
Concluding on the Obama discourse, regarding the war on terror, a striking difference 
between Bush and Obama, lies the construction of the temporal relational distance 
between the Self and the non-Other. On this particular aspect, Bush articulates a ‘ranking of 
progress’, placing America on top, being superior to the Islamic world, that is yet incapable 
of undertaking responsibility, and is thus dependent on American crusade in order to 
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convert, enabling progress (Bush; 2002). On the contrary, Obama is explicit about his 
vision of partnership between the American Self and the Afghan Government. Thus, Obama 
does not explicate this non-Other as being less progressed in the sense of ideological 
backwardness; It is assigned responsibility, because it is articulated as capable. With 
America also assigned responsible, the Self and the Other are temporarily related as equals, 
in an ideological sense, fit for partnership. 
 However, Obama takes upon him the ‘ranking of progress’, from the Bush 
discourse, in regard to another Other, Syria. The temporal dimension is expressed in the 
following Obama statement: ‘(…) in Syria, I have no doubt that the Assad regime will soon 
discover that the forces of change cannot be reversed and that human dignity cannot be 
denied.’ (Obama; 2012). Obama does not explicate vision of partnership or tolerance. 
Rather, he is pointing out that the Assad regime has not yet understood what America has 
already comprehended. The Assad regime is in need of conversion. Thus, the temporal 
relation, the radical difference in the ideological progressiveness of America and Syria, is 
articulated as of a hierarchical nature. This Other is constructed as temporarily less 
progressed than the temporarily ‘achieved’ America.  
 However, a difference between Bush and Obama in regards to this employment 
of hierarchical differentiating on temporality can be argued for. While constructing 
America as being more progressed than the Assad regime, Obama clearly articulates the 
temporality of this Other, being capable of change. As explicated by Obama, the Assad 
regime will soon ‘discover’ that ‘human dignity’ is universal (Obama; 2012). This is 
contrastive to Bush, who legitimizes securitization by constructing the radical Other as 
temporarily incapable of change. Obama does not securitize by this point, leaving open the 
opportunity for the Other to progress. However, I would interpret that by Obama, ‘human 
dignity’, being a universal principle, is claimed an existential necessity, giving its nature, 
that it ‘cannot be denied’ (Obama; 2012). This issue is unquestionably a subject for 
potential future securitization, giving if the Assad regime does not ‘discover’, thus providing 
Obama with a security argument. 
 
Even though Obama is not enabling a securitization by constructing the Assad regime as a 
stasis of ‘evil’, this case however indicates that we might not speak of separate presidential 
discourses, in relation to Bush and Obama, as I have been suggestive of, but rather that 
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there is a general discourse, drawing from Wilsonianism, from which these presidents 
adopt aspects suited to the specific security and political issues.  
 What could be employed, extending the findings in the present rapport, could be 
a more profound examination on Wilsonian discourse regarding other issues. Upon my 
findings in the analysis, I will assume that the Wilsonian arrogance is likely more present in 
relation to securitized issues, or issues of potential securitization, as if Wilsonian arrogance 
is supportive of a securitization. There seem to be consistency between the Wilsonian 
arrogance and the claim of existential necessity.   
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